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This I believe
ration laws

of them

be unsound. The various

to

state

corpo

codes in the true sense, though some
described. Nor is the British Companies

are not
so

are

Act, despite its length and elaboration. All the

statutes

presuppose basic common law and equitable principles
most of which are nowhere embodied in
legislation. And

these basic

principles are derived from the same roots in
heritage. Furthermore, the various corpora
tion laws show striking similarities. That all this is so as
regards the various states of the Union is recognized by
our common

your national law schools, which teach, not the corporate
law of any particular state, but the general principles of
American

generally

law. That these

corporation
the

same as

those

applying

to

principles are
English corpora

tion law is the

only ground on which the Harvard Law
to justify their
temerity in bringing
me, an English lawyer, to Harvard to teach American
corporation law.
In the course of this teaching (and learning) I have
been struck by the basic similarities. But I have also been
impressed by the divergencies. These divergencies are, I
believe, of some interest and significance and worthy of
study by the lawyers of both our countries. If I fail to
School could attempt
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intention today is to draw certain contrasts between
the present state of corporation law in Britain and in the
United States. This might be thought
to be a

My

necessarily

pointless
states

and

has its

unprofitable activity.

own

another, differing

this,

deficiencies

which I

(of

ment) rather
subject.

than

The seeds of the
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Sir Ernest Cassel Professor of Commercial

Law

convince you of

Since each of the
code
and
Great Britain has
corporation
both in form and in content from that

of any of the states, how can there be any common
ground on which to base a comparison or contrast?

-now

probably

it

to

think, be due to my own
very conscious at this mo
the inherent barrenness of my
will,

I

am

Anglo-American

the

in the world-had

business

corporation
important economic institution
been sown prior to the eighteenth
then produced any very notable fruit.
most

century but had not
All that the American colonists took with them from
England was an embryonic law of corporations-munic

ipal

rather than business

law of

corporations-and an embryonic
English attempt at corporate

The first

partnership.
legislation, the wordy and obscure Bubble Act, was
passed in 1720 as a result of the South Sea Bubble. It was
designed to curb the growth of unincorporated joint
stock

companies,

as we now

American

but its actual result

know from the

scholar,

was
very different,
pioneer research work of an

Dr. Armand Dubois.

Paradoxically

it
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caused the government to exhibit great reluctance to
a re
grant charters of incorporation and thus produced
birth of the unincorporated association which the act had

sought
act

to

It

destroy.

of Parliament
that

registration,

until 1844, when a general
for incorporation by simple

was not

provided

incorporation

England. Moreover,
fully

was

in

readily granted

then the members of the corpo
liable for the corporation's debts;

even

ration remained

it took another eleven years before limited liability was
recognized. This somewhat arbitrary separation between

incorporation and limited liability
that

announce

day

the end of its name. Such
between incorporation and limited liability
word "Limited"

at

(for some
general you

Massachusetts), but in
heavy weather of this matter
in

your

insists

states

on

than

a

separation

was

years it

unknown in America

course,

for the fact

in Britain every limited company has to
its members' irresponsibility by having the

this

to

accounts

made much less

did, and

we

not, of

prevailed

the word "Limited"

as

none

of

the sole per

missible indication of

incorporation.
England, therefore, incorporation with limited lia
bility by a simple process of registration is less than a
In

hundred years old-it attains its centenary only this year.
Having regard to the transcendent role played by Eng

land in the mercantile community during the nineteenth
and early twentieth centuries this is difficult to credit;
but so it is. Prior to 1855 joint-stock enterprise had existed

operated principally in the guise of the unincor
porated company or partnership. The legislation of 1844
and 1855 adopted this familiar form of organization and

but had

conferred
limited

it the boon of corporate personality and
Hence the modern English business

on

liability.

corporation has evolved from the unincorporated partner

ship

based

on

corporation
more

to

mutual agreement rather than from the
on a
grant from the state and owes

based

partnership principles

than

to

rules based

on

corporate personality. This is reflected in the fact that we
in England still do not talk about "business corporations"
or

about

"corporation

law" but about

"companies

and

company law."

In

America,

wisely,

on

the other

hand, the Bubble

have been

Act seems,
the fact that it had

ignored-despite
been extended to the Colonies by an act of 1741. After
the Declaration of Independence, incorporation, by special
acts of the state legislatures, was granted far more readily
than in England, and the unincorporated joint-stock
company, though not unknown, was correspondingly less
important. In a number of industrially important states
incorporation by registration under a general act came
earlier than in England-thirty-three years earlier in
New

to

York-and, when

legislative

it came, the model which the

draftsmen had in mind

was

rather than the

the statutory

cor

unincorporated company
corporation law
owes less to
and
more to
partnership
corporate principles.
But, although America was earlier in her recognition

poration

partnership.

Hence modern American

or

of the distinctive roles of
she

corporations,

drew the distinction between them with the

never

clarity

same

and

partnerships

England

as

has since 1844. We then recog

partnership form was not intrinsically
large joint-stock enterprise, for partnership prin

nized that the
suited

to

presuppose mutual trust and confidence among the
members which is impossible if their number is unduly

ciples

large.

The

English legislature

therefore

prescribed

a

limit

twenty. If the number of mem
bers exceeds twenty, the association must register as a
corporation. By a stroke of the pen the formerly common
limit which is

-a

now

company with a large mem
In America no such develop

unincorporated joint-stock
bership became impossible.
ment

occurred, and

tain purposes

was

unincorporated

in

incorporation for

where

states

not

until

recognized

association continued

a

cer

late date the

flourish. Hence

to

which represents the
or
final evolution of the unincorporated company, distin
guished now from the partnership in that the members
business

the Massachusetts

trust

personal liability-a refinement which Eng
attaining.
At this time a further development took place which
may have had some significance. During the course of

are

free from

land

never

succeeded in

the nineteenth century

(starting

with New Y or k and

states borrowed
1822),
limited part
of
the
the
device
Europe
do
so until 1907; until then
did
not
nership. England
legal freedom from personal liability could be attained
only through incorporation. Accordingly, the business
world and its astute legal advisers proceeded to adapt the
corporate form for use by the one-man firm or small
family concern, thus defeating the obvious legislative in
tent to restrict corporations to large associations and
partnerships to small ones. This development, finally

Connecticut in

most

American

from continental

sanctified
Salomon
to

by
v.

the House of Lords in the famous

Salomon in

1897, led

to

the

private

case

of

company

a few
years later the legislature itself granted
immunities. American efforts to evolve the close

which

special

corporation as a suitable
limited or unlimited, did
and

met

with difficulties

substitute for the
not come

to

which I shall refer later.

I have stressed these differences in the

and

relationship

be

various times in

corporations
partnerships
respective histories because I believe they explain

tween
our

partnership,

until somewhat later

at

modern
many of the present differences between our
elaborate
this
I
before
systems of corporate law. But

point perhaps I may bring up to date this rapid historical
de
survey by a brief reference to the twentieth-century
we have both been concerned
main
In
the
velopments.
with the same two vital problems: first, the protection
of investors when they buy corporate securities, and,
second, the subjecting of corporate management

to some

sort
by the stockholders. In England measures
have
been taken by revisions of the Companies
end
to this
of roughly twenty years after a detailed
intervals
Act at

of control

investigation by

an

expert committee

appointed by

the

The
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Board of Trade-the government

general supervision
of the

two

states

sky laws, which,

over

department exercising
companies. In America all but

have tackled the first problem by blue
if they have done nothing else, have

produced a nation-wide picture of such devastating com
plication as seriously to hamper the tasks of an interstate
issuer and of the securities industry. But, happily, you
have more recently made a determined attack on both
problems through federal legislation setting up the Secu
rities and Exchange Commission and, in so doing, have
produced a body of rational corporation law which, in
many respects, is the envy of the English.,speaking world.
To

this, too, I shall revert later.
It is in the context of this historical sketch that I want
to draw attention to certain
contrasting aspects of our
modern systems of corporate law. In the time at my
disposal I have had to paint the history in the broadest
strokes, and similarly I can only select a few topics for
further treatment in outline only.
I have

already stressed the differing reliance on part
nership principles. Let me illustrate this further. In both
England and America it is recognized that the business
corporation performs at least two distinct economic pur
poses.

First, it enables skilled entrepreneurs

to

enlist

masses of
capital which they employ to the advan
of
the
absentee
owners. Here we have the
tage
publicly
owned corporation, the wealth and importance of which

large

may exceed that of most of the
Second, it enables the small

states

of North America.

partnership

or
single trader
the business and to separate its assets and
liabilities from those of its members. Here we have what
England calls the "private company" and America the
"close corporation." Economically, it is less

to

personify

important
anything but insig
nificant; indeed, in view of the grave expense of making
a
public issue of securities, it is probably a vital link in the
process of growth from private firm to large public com
than the

public corporation,

but it is

pany. In some repects the needs of the two types differ.
The public corporation needs centralized

management

distinguished

from the

owners.

In the

private or close
desired; probably

this may not be needed or
the managers and the shareholders will be the same
people and will not clearly differentiate what they do in
one
capacity from what they do in the other. The idea that

corporation

they

must

manage

themselves

as

as

fiduciary

directors for the benefit of
owners will strike them

passive beneficial

legalistic nonsense. Again, in the public company the
shares of stock must be freely transferable; the so-called
"owners" demand a liquid investment. In the close
as

corporation

this is

likely to be wanted any more than
it is in a partnership. The
incorporators want to continue
as
partners albeit with the advantages of corporate per
sonality; they do not want other people to be able to step
not

into the shoes of their
co-partners.
Both England and America have evolved

corporate

body brilliantly

suited

to meet

the

of the

ing

of the

quite

a

type of

delivering

his lecture in Law South

company. England has succeeded in adapt
form so that it also meets the requirements

public

the

same

incorporated partnership.
successful. Why?

America has

not

been

so

The

for

reason

tution of the

our

success, I

think,

is that the consti

English business corporation

is still regarded
essentially contractual. Whereas the American statutes
tend to lay down mandatory rules, the English Com
panies Act relies far more on the technique of the Part
nership Act, providing a standard form which applies
only in the absence of contrary agreement by the parties.
Much that in America is mandatory is in England in
cluded only in the optional model constitution-the
as

famous Table A. And this, or whatever the parties substi
tute for it, is expressly declared by the act to bind the
company and the members as though it were a contract
under seal. In particular this contractual constitution

deals with the method of appointing the directors, with
the division of powers between them and the stock

holders, and, subject

meetings and
have

generally

to important
exceptions, with the
of each. In America these matters
been fixed by statute and fixed in a way

votes

which shows that the draftsman envisaged their applica
tion to publicly owned corporations. I need not remind
you of the difficulties which these statutory norms have

caused

to those
wishing to provide safeguards perfectly
reasonable in the case of dose corporations. Leading
cases, such as McQuade v. Stoneham, Clark v. Dodge,
and Benintendi v. Kenton Hotels, illustrate these diffi
culties. To an Englishman it is strange that corporate
codes such as that of Delaware, which are notoriously lax

in

failing

provide important safeguards against abuses,

to

should nevertheless be strict in matters which seem to us
to be
essentially matters for the parties themselves to
settle. There are now clear indications that the same view
is

beginning

latures. As

requirements

Gower

Professor

statute was
some

a

to appeal to American courts and
legis
result of the Benintendi case the New York

modified

of the

so as to

flexibility

provide

in

inherent in the

jurisdiction
English model.

one

More

recently

New

a

Jersey

(Katcher

case

Ohsman)

v.

attitude which

a marked change in judicial
a
herald
general reversal of the earlier rigid rule.
may
Similar considerations apply to restrictions on the
transfer of shares. English law has always regarded com

has shown

constitution
pany shares as creatures of the company's
and therefore as essentially contractual choses in action.
Hence there is

ding

legal objection

no

or

which it

rights

tial conditions of

contract

forbid

transferability of

Indeed,
a private

creates.

recognition

the

to

freedom of

restraining the

or

shares

one

as

of the

the

essen

company is

that the constitution should "restrict the right to transfer
its shares." The most common form of restriction is to
directors

give the
enabling

them

to

unfettered

an

veto

transfers, thus

on

preserve the

of the association

just

as

essentially personal
effectively as in a partnership.
nature

argued that such a far-reaching restric
tion, or an option or right of first refusal vested in the
other shareholders, is invalid. (Perhaps I may here add
No

has

one

in

ever

that the

parentheses

other shareholders,

England

a

less

were

they

be vested in the

must

purchase

cannot

issued

expressly
only subject

conception of

This

option

itself, for

in the company

not

company

shares and then

to

share

a

its

own

shares

in
un

redeemable

preferred
stringent safeguards.)
as

as

a

contractual chose in

action is not, of course, unknown in America. As Holmes
said in one of his early cases: "Stock in a corporation
...

relation

personal

creates a

otherwise than

analogous

technically to a partnership. There seems to be no greater
objection to obtaining the right of choosing one's asso
ciates in

a

corporation than

in

a

firm." But in America

the contractual aspect has always had to struggle with
the conflicting notion that a share is "property," the aliena
tion of which

be

must not

restrictions which in

unreasonably

England

American

courts

be

to

seem

restrained. Hence

would have been

allowed have been struck down.

Only recently

freely
do the

the contractual

allowing

triumph. A strong example of this is the re
concept
cent Massachusetts case of Lewis v. Hood. But as yet
to

this

development

lute

veto.

Similarly
extent

has

stopped

short of

allowing

an

abso

sphere of taxation English law has
partnership analogy to prevail to a greater

in the

than in

America in

America. True, England

regarding

the

incorporated

agrees

company

with
as

a

taxpaying person and to this extent distinguishes
a
partnership which is not. True, too, there is
possibility that corporations will be subject to taxes

separate
it from
the

from which individuals

corporation

plicable

to

is

are

subject

not

free. On the other hand, the
the additional surtax ap

to

individuals in the

within limits similar

lated

earnings tax,
profits. As regards
will be liable

ordinary

deemed

to

have accounted for that. In other
is freed from the double

porate trading
volved in America. This somewhat

words,

cor

taxation in

illogical

mixture

of corporate and partnership principles means that cor
porate trading is far less likely than in America to be

disadvantageous
be

tax-wise and

Whereas

advantageous.

encourage the
law has tended to
to

provision

new

certain

(but

at

least

English

equally likely

tax

to

law has tended

private, company, American revenue
discourage the close corporation; the

in the Internal Revenue Code

partnerships
vice versa)

to

not

elect

to

be taxed

perhaps

may

as

entitling

corporations

accentuate

this tend

ency.

Before

leaving

the

private

it clear that its evolution has
out

problems.

The famous

company I
not

case

ought

make

to

with

proceeded entirely
of Salomon

Salomon,

v.

which is its parent, laid down the corporate entity prin
ciple with such rigor that English judges have found
much greater difficulty than their American colleagues
in piercing the corporate veil when public policy so de

mands. Further, the granting of various immunities to
private companies caused advantage to be taken of them

by public companies which found it convenient to oper
ate through private subsidiaries. This abuse made it
com
necessary for the legislature to subdivide private
to
and
into
two
nonexempt-and
classes-exempt
panies
restrict the most prized advantage (freedom from pub
lishing to the world its balance sheet and profit-and-loss
account) to the exempt class. To be exempt, companies
must satisfy detailed and rigorous conditions designed to
insure that they are genuine family concerns. Still, allow
ing for these complications, there can be little doubt that
the private company has satisfactorily met a need felt
equally in America but for which American law has not
as
yet supplied an equally satisfactory instrument.
In most respects, therefore, the English legislature and
courts have relied on partnership principles to a greater
than have the American. But there are some
respects in which the converse is true. One example is in
connection with the doctrine of pre-emptive rights under
extent

existing stockholders have the right to sub
capital issued by the company. England
has never adopted this doctrine as a compulsory legal
rule. Commonly similar rights are expressly conferred
which the

allowed the

to
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to

those

surtax

tax

brackets, and,

imposed by

accumu

higher

will be avoided

distributed

to surtax on

profits,

your

on

plowed-back

the stockholders

the dividends received but

income tax-the

company's

not

assessment

is

scribe for further

in the constitution of

a

private

company,

and, until the

provided. But
only restraint on
the directors is that entailed by the rule that they must
act as fiduciaries when issuing further capital. In other
words, English law has always been what some Ameri
Table A

latest revision, the. optional
in the absence of express provision the

can

has

so

writers wish American law had been and what it
now

become in many

states.

The

original

strict

rule,

logical application of partnership prin
and
the
partnership analogy was expressly adopted
ciples,
when the rule was originally formulated in 1807 in the
however,

was

a

Continued

on

page 20
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1932. Has two sons, ages twelve and

Clubs. Married

Men's
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Ave., Chicago

49. Office:

7.

it for the first

twenty-five!

It

might

sim

if you would let the Law School know
time what you are doing for the next

plify procedures
from time

to

twenty-five.

This

above

success

unless

some

story, the School might think it exaggerated
healthy contributions are forthcoming from

brings

to

mind the fact

that, after the

everyone of you. The Law School has made great
strides. Those of you who are in touch know that there
truly are a new set of "greats" training the minds of the

future. The School has outgrown its physical
needs your help and deserves your support.
To all of you the best of

everything

to

capacity.

It

be wished for.

To those of you who have taken the trouble to fill out
your questionnaire, it has been a real pleasure to hear
from you; it is a genuine loss to the School
heard from the others. Looking ahead to

however,
himself

to

case

of

Gray

cannot

fiftieth,

Law-

from page

4

Portland

v.

land should have
I

our

have

hoped

Corporation
Continued

not to

that another classmate will groom
further this adulatory saga of the Class of '30.

it is

Bank. Why

rejected

explain; but,

an

I

turn

obvious

in this respect Eng
partnership analogy

when I review the difficulties that

the strict rule has caused in America, I
that we were wise to do so.

cannot

but think

Again, the American courts have adopted the partner
ship analogy as regards the stockholders' rights to in
spect the corporate books and records. The English courts
have rejected it, holding that a stockholder as such has
no
right to inspect the financial records. It is perhaps

lem of investor

thing

be denied

that he could

the absence of

a

access

lawsuit. Without this he may
the list of stockholders-some

to

always obtain
statutory regulation,

legal rights-rights

in

he

which may be

England. Still, in
clearly has greater

a

source

of grave

described

matters

two

as

protection.

disregarded)
philosophy-that

have relied in the main

on

the

of disclosure. Both have

provided
or mate

rial omissions which

indeed

strict common-law

But

supplement and
fraud principles.

reverse

the

post facto
sanctions are far less effective than initial scrutiny of the
prospectus to insure its accuracy and completeness. In
America this vital task of initial screening has been in
trusted to government agencies-the Securities and Ex
change Commission-in cases to which the Securities
Act applies. It is here that English law appears extraor
dinarily lax to the American observer. The Companies
Act requires registration at the Companies Registry of
the prospectus and prescribes its contents. But neither
the Registry nor anyone else is given the task of pre
liminary investigation to insure the accuracy of the
information disclosed, and until 1948 there was not even
a
mandatory "waiting period." The explanation of this
apparent anomaly is found in the different and infinitely
simpler organization of the securities industry in Eng
land. The over-the-counter market scarcely exists, and
in practice no public offering can be made without ob
taining a quotation for the shares on one of the recog
nized stock exchanges, normally London. These stock
exchanges have their own rules which in many respects
are far more stringent than those of the act and which
require the publication of the prospectus in the national
press where it will be commented on and criticized by
the financial columnists. The issue must be sponsored
by members of the Exchange and, in practice, will be
undertaken and underwritten by one of a small number
of issuing houses ("investment bankers," as you call
them) of high repute. To protect their own reputations
and to preserve their freedom from possible legal sanc
tions, these brokers, dealers, and issuing houses subject
the issues which they back to the most stringent scrutiny.
ex

scrutiny, moreover, transcends investigation merely
accuracy-the sponsor.s will want to insure that the
issue is sound financially as well as legally. In other
words, we, with our simpler and more unified organiza

of

corporation without

consideration of the

sanctions, civil and criminal, for misstatements

This

even

a

laws" be

stockholder in

practice this puts the American
much stronger position than his Eng
lish confrere. Reports suggest that in many (perhaps
most) cases his rights will not be recognized by the

to

as

On the first aspect I do not propose to say much. Both
our countries
(at least if most of your state "blue-sky

doubtful whether in
a

now

which I have

same

Addendum
Well, that's

a

law has in this respect treated the stockholder
creditor rather than a partner.

tion, have been able

private enterprise

to

leave the vital task of

instead of

to

public

screening

to

authorities. That

this system works pretty well is, I think, shown by the
fact that in recent years there have been only a handful
of criminal prosecutions arising out of misleading pro-
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strides. Those of you who are in touch know that there
truly are a new set of "greats" training the minds of the

future. The School has outgrown its physical
needs your help and deserves your support.
To all of you the best of

everything

to

capacity.

It

be wished for.

To those of you who have taken the trouble to fill out
your questionnaire, it has been a real pleasure to hear
from you; it is a genuine loss to the School
heard from the others. Looking ahead to

however,
himself

to

case

of

Gray

cannot

fiftieth,

Law-

from page

4

Portland

v.

land should have
I

our

have

hoped

Corporation
Continued

not to

that another classmate will groom
further this adulatory saga of the Class of '30.

it is

Bank. Why

rejected

explain; but,

an

I

turn

obvious

in this respect Eng
partnership analogy

when I review the difficulties that

the strict rule has caused in America, I
that we were wise to do so.

cannot

but think

Again, the American courts have adopted the partner
ship analogy as regards the stockholders' rights to in
spect the corporate books and records. The English courts
have rejected it, holding that a stockholder as such has
no
right to inspect the financial records. It is perhaps

lem of investor

thing

be denied

that he could

the absence of

a

access

lawsuit. Without this he may
the list of stockholders-some

to

always obtain
statutory regulation,

legal rights-rights

in

he

which may be

England. Still, in
clearly has greater

a

source

of grave

described

matters

two

as

protection.

disregarded)
philosophy-that

have relied in the main

on

the

of disclosure. Both have

provided
or mate

rial omissions which

indeed

strict common-law

But

supplement and
fraud principles.

reverse

the

post facto
sanctions are far less effective than initial scrutiny of the
prospectus to insure its accuracy and completeness. In
America this vital task of initial screening has been in
trusted to government agencies-the Securities and Ex
change Commission-in cases to which the Securities
Act applies. It is here that English law appears extraor
dinarily lax to the American observer. The Companies
Act requires registration at the Companies Registry of
the prospectus and prescribes its contents. But neither
the Registry nor anyone else is given the task of pre
liminary investigation to insure the accuracy of the
information disclosed, and until 1948 there was not even
a
mandatory "waiting period." The explanation of this
apparent anomaly is found in the different and infinitely
simpler organization of the securities industry in Eng
land. The over-the-counter market scarcely exists, and
in practice no public offering can be made without ob
taining a quotation for the shares on one of the recog
nized stock exchanges, normally London. These stock
exchanges have their own rules which in many respects
are far more stringent than those of the act and which
require the publication of the prospectus in the national
press where it will be commented on and criticized by
the financial columnists. The issue must be sponsored
by members of the Exchange and, in practice, will be
undertaken and underwritten by one of a small number
of issuing houses ("investment bankers," as you call
them) of high repute. To protect their own reputations
and to preserve their freedom from possible legal sanc
tions, these brokers, dealers, and issuing houses subject
the issues which they back to the most stringent scrutiny.
ex

scrutiny, moreover, transcends investigation merely
accuracy-the sponsor.s will want to insure that the
issue is sound financially as well as legally. In other
words, we, with our simpler and more unified organiza

of

corporation without

consideration of the

sanctions, civil and criminal, for misstatements

This

even

a

laws" be

stockholder in

practice this puts the American
much stronger position than his Eng
lish confrere. Reports suggest that in many (perhaps
most) cases his rights will not be recognized by the

to

as

On the first aspect I do not propose to say much. Both
our countries
(at least if most of your state "blue-sky

doubtful whether in
a

now

which I have

same

Addendum
Well, that's

a

law has in this respect treated the stockholder
creditor rather than a partner.

tion, have been able

private enterprise

to

leave the vital task of

instead of

to

public

screening

to

authorities. That

this system works pretty well is, I think, shown by the
fact that in recent years there have been only a handful
of criminal prosecutions arising out of misleading pro-
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spectuses, and, since the war, not a single
of a civil action for damages or recision.

reported

There is, however, one respect in which
socialized than you in this field. Since the

we are more

case

instructions about

on

priorities

by the Chancellor of the
given
In
has not proved too pain
this
curb
practice
Exchequer.
ful to the business world; indeed, in recent months con
to

it from time

to

of inside information in

time

solve the

lationship.

The

perhaps,

are

our

different attempts

of the

management-shareholder re
fundamental principle is, of course, the

problem

in both countries: the directors and officers

same

are

Securities

Exchange

should be revealed.

oppressed by the difficulty
satisfactory procedure for enforcing the
evolving
directors' duties. In both it is recognized that, unless a
stockholder's individual rights are infringed, the primary
remedy is an action by the company or a stockholder's
derivative suit. We in England do not call it a "deriva
tive action," but we recognize that that is what it is. On
the other hand, the rule prevailing in many jurisdictions
Both countries have been

of

a

and under the Federal Rules of Procedure that the stock
holder must first serve a demand for action on the direc

and sometimes

tors

had

to

no

corporation's se
develop your
"insider-trading"
to

we

special register
in shares by directors

money is raised.
More interesting,

re

even

have gone is to provide for a
of directors' holdings, so that any dealings

Act. The farthest

granted
readily
pealing the restriction as no longer needed. The main
complaints in the past have been about the former policy
of refusing permission for bonus issues ("stock divi
dends," as you call them) which, rather anomalously,
require Treasury consent notwithstanding that no new

that there is talk of

so

started

hardly
"special facts" doctrine, and we have
rules comparable to those under the

in

has been

sent

in the

dealings

curities. We have

beginning of
the war, the consent of the Treasury has been required
for any issue by which a company raises more than £50,000 (say, $150,000) in any year. This restriction is, of
course, designed to insure that our limited capital re
sources are
employed in accordance with national priori
ties. But even here the Treasury has subcontracted (as it
were) to private enterprise (much as you did with your
Voluntary Credit Restraint Program in 1950-52), for the
Treasury acts on the advice of a committee of industrial
ists, bankers, and the like known as the Capital Issues
Committee, which works
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stockholders also does

on

it

England, although

old rule in Foss
land in
In

an

v.

to

uncommon.

Harbottle, which still survives in Eng

We have

to enact

actions
not

are

in

mysterious

form.

England relatively

been faced with the

same

blackmailing suits and have not
special legislation to curb this abuse. This
the general English rule that the loser pays

of "strike"

is because of

prevail

be derived from the

emasculated and somewhat

practice derivative

problem

seems

not

or

the whole of the costs, including the winner's advocate's
fees. Any litigation, and especially the more fancy types,
is therefore an unattractive gamble. Hence actions against

only

if

fiduciaries

directors have been

English

the company goes into liquidation, when the Companies
Act affords the liquidator a summary remedy against
miscreant directors and officers. Our main problem has

owing duties of care, loyalty, and a modicum
of skill. By and large the application of this principle to
particular facts is, so far as I can judge, much the same.
courts

tend

rule of thumb-such
take

as

personal advantage
with less

move

ard

to

to

be strict when

they

apply

can

the rule that directors

a

must not

of

assurance

a
corporate opportunity. They
when they have no fixed stand

them: American

guide
ready-or, perhaps,

courts are

perhaps

rather

I should say less unready-to
hold that directors' actions exceed the permissible bounds

more

of their business

ficulty

judgment.

In both countries

has been found when the

controlling

some

dif

directors

have taken the precaution of securing a favorable reso
lution at a general meeting. In both countries lip service
is

paid

their

to

the

votes as

decisions,
both the

as

true

alleged

rule that the

majority

must

exercise

fiduciaries. But in neither country do the
I understand them, really support this. In
rule

seems to

be that the

majority

must not

expropriate the property of the company or of the minor
ity, and here again I think that American courts have
been

more successful in
applying this rule. Certain it is
that the supervision of the SEC in certain reorganiza
tions has prevented unfairness to minority interests, such

preferred shareholders, in circumstances in which the
English requirement of confirmation by the court has
failed to provide an adequate safeguard. America, too, is
far in advance of England as regards restraining abuse
as

rare.

Normally they

occur

company remains a going concern,
the derivative action is not an effective sanction.

been

that, while the

the company to cease to be a
winding-up of companies has long
from jurisdiction in bankruptcy, and

One solution is

going

concern.

to cause

The

been

separated
liquidation-voluntary and compulsory-have
comprised a large part of our companies' legislation. Of
particular importance in the present context is the rule
enabling the court to wind up a company on the ground
that it is just and equitable-a ground which is another
relic of the partnership. This power can be used to put·
rules for

an

end

to a course

of

the controllers. Once

oppressive conduct on the part of
a
winding-up is made, the liqui

dator, supervised and supported by the court and the
Board of Trade, has effective powers of investigation
and recovery. A similar solution seems to be available
in America as part of the inherent equity jurisdiction,
and greater

use

of it has been advocated. But a recent
to employ this expedient in the

attempt in New York

of a foreign corporation was not successful.
The weakness of this solution, however, is that liqui
dation may be singularly unfortunate from the viewpoint
of those oppressed, particularly if they are preferred
case
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stockholders with restricted

power

tal. Hence the latest

of

alternative

an

rights to repayment of capi
English Act provides by Section 210
remedy under which any shareholder who

complains that
ducted in

the affairs of the company

oppressive

a manner

to some

being

are

part of the

con

mem

bers may petition the court, which may impose upon the
parties whatever settlement it considers just. The court's
order may regulate the future conduct of the company's
may alter the

affairs,
direct

one

party

of its constitution, or may
the other. This remedy, it

terms

buyout

to

will be

observed, resembles Section 225 of the Delaware
Corporation Law and Section 25 of the New York Gen
eral Corporation Laws in that it enables an individual
shareholder

to

the restrictive

bring

an

action in his

provisions applying

right free from
derivative actions.

own

to

But, unlike these sections, it is of general application and
restricted to,
elections.
not

directed at,

primarily

or

There have

as
yet been few
of this section, and,
of them-reported

reported

disputed

instances of the

application
my information
none
or
otherwise-has
been
goes,
successful. Nevertheless, I can testify from personal ex
perience that the section has been of undoubted value
especially in the case of small companies. Threats of an
application
directors

to

so

far

as

have in many cases brought the
misbehaving
heel without further action, and, in view

of the difficulties under
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an inspector to
investigate the affairs
This
is
of
one
the
company.
very few respects in
which the powers of the Board of Trade exceed those
of your SEC. The Board may exercise this power in a

appoint

to

a

of

circumstances; for example, if there are cir
suggesting oppression of minorities, or fraud
misconduct by the directors, or failure to give the

variety

cumstances
or

stockholders information which
expect. The inspector (normally

they might reasonably
an
independent barris

solicitor,

or
accountant) reports to the Board, and
the report is published. This alone may cause
the wrong to be remedied; indeed, that may occur as a
result of preliminary investigations by the officials of the

ter,

normally

Board. If this does

not suffice, the
report should at least
the stockholder with the essential ammunition.

provide

But he himself may still not need to use it, for the
Board of Trade is empowered to institute civil or crim
inal proceedings or to petition for winding up or for

the

alternative

new

remedy

if the individual stockholder

under Section 210. Hence,
can
persuade the Board to

act, he may find that all his chestnuts are pulled out of
the fire for him without any expense to himself. It is
therefore not surprising that this remedy is of growing
popularity and that complaints have been made to the

Board in well

Inspectors

over a

have been

hundred

in the last six years.
in sixteen of these cases,

cases

appointed

and in many others preliminary discussions have
about a settlement agreeable to the complainant.

system of enabling
the court to find a solution and
forcing it on the parties,
I suspect that this new weapon in the shareholders'
armory will always be more effective when brandished in
terrorem than when
actually wielded in court. But it is a

certain American writers have advocated. It has the great
merit that it prevents expense from deterring the prose

weapon of real

cution of

The other

an

value, and

difficulty,

adversary

I commend it

and this would

derivative action but equally
remedy if it stood alone, is that

to
a

to

your attention.

apply

our

not

new

only

to a

alternative

stockholder is

at a

great
vis-a-vis the management as regards the
information at his disposal. Something can be done
by
compulsory disclosure through annual returns and re
ports and in particular through annual accounts. Until

disadvantage

have been in advance of you in the amount
thus required, but, in the case of companies
which the SEC Acts and
you have
Regulations

recently we
of publicity
to

apply,
caught and overtaken us. The main flaw in the
American picture is that these regulations do not
apply
to all
companies or even to all public ones. In any event,
disclosure of this type, though it may enable the stock
now

holders

detect the symptoms of sickness in the cor
porate body, is not likely to show him the cause of the
ailment. It will certainly not provide him with the evi
dence which he needs to bring a lawsuit
against those
whom he suspects to be the source of the infection. What
he needs is some means of
out before he em
barks

to

finding

on

litigation

whether

his

suspicions

are

well

founded.
In

England

has been found

This solution of the

interesting solution

by conferring

to

this

problem

upon the Board of Trade

is similar

to

that which

just complaints, while obviating the danger of
not appoint an

strike actions. The Board of Trade will

inspector unless satisfied that there are strong grounds
for suspicion, but, if an appointment is made and mis
conduct revealed, they will see that it is rectified, with
this to the hazards of private litigation. Fur
of obtaining information, it has certain
method
ther,
obvious advantages over the American rule allowing the
stockholder himself to snoop through the company's
records. As I have already pointed out, he will normally
have to fight an action before he is allowed to exercise
that right, and, if he is ultimately successful, he may
abuse the confidential information thus obtained. Both
these disadvantages are avoided by the English solution.
out

leaving
as a

Fortunately, however,
tively

misconduct

by

directors is rela

Of greater practical importance than the
of the dishonest is the removal of the lazy or

rare.

pursuit
incompetent.

In other words, the crux of the manage
ment-shareholder problem is to make more effective
the exercise of the stockholders' rights at general meet

their

ings-especially

right

to

"hire and fire" the direc

torate.

Until
an

problem

brought

recently

meetings
And in

have
some

the American rules

been,

to

respects

relating to general
English eyes, extraordinarily lax.
they still are, despite the SEC

The

Vol. 4, No.3

proxy rules. If, as I have previously suggested, American
acts make mandatory certain things which might well be

left

to

the

incorporators

to

settle, there

are

other

matters

which we in England have thought it essential
regulate
by statute which your acts have left to the parties. For
example, we have thought it right to insist that a certain
proportion (10 per cent) of the stockholders shall have
power to compel the convening of a special general
meeting. Under many of your statutes the stockholders
cannot do so unless the by-laws happen so to provide.
to

And it

seems

holders have

strange

to us

that in

most states

the stock

power to remove directors-at any rate,
in the absence of misconduct-until the expiration of

their

terms

no

of office. Hence, if the staggered system of
operation, one who has acquired a majority
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voting machinery. And, here, your SEC proxy rules,
when they apply, are far more effective than anything
we have in
England. There permission to vote by proxy
is mandatory, and the notice of the meeting must ad
vertise the

solicit

right

proxies

at

all stockholders

to vote

the

in this way. If the management
expense, they must solicit

company's
and not just a

selected few-a

point

not

covered in the SEC proxy rules. Two-way proxies are
not
compulsory under the act but are under the rules
of the London Stock

Exchange, which amounts to the
of publicly held companies. More
thing
over, these rules provide that proxy forms must be sent
out by
management when any proposals (other than of
a
purely routine nature) are being considered-here
in the

same

case

ahead of the SEC rules. But, and this is

election is in

again

of the stock may have to wait not merely to the next
annual meeting but perhaps for several years before he

the grave weakness, we have no detailed regulations re
garding the contents of proxy statements. In connection

gain control of the board.
Only if staggered elections are banned is the majority
shareholder in a reasonably strong position; if the recent
decision in Wolfson v. Avery is upheld on appeal, this
is so under Illinois law. But in some states the staggered
voting system, especially if coupled with cumulative vot
ing, may postpone for many years the time when the
winner of a proxy fight can enjoy the full fruits of his
victory. In England not only can a meeting be sum
moned forthwith but the whole of the existing board can
then be dismissed by ordinary resolution. This, you
may think, is carrying majority rule and stockholder
democracy too far.
As you will have gathered, cumulative voting is un

with

can

known in

England,

We still like

and I have

never

heard it advocated.

think of boards of directors

as united
of managers rather than as representative of diver
gent interests overseeing the management. Perhaps we
are
very old-fashioned and behind the times-but that
is a national characteristic. However, the
contrary idea

to

teams

we

are

types of reorganization the act, it is true,

some

for the disclosure of certain matters-for

provides
ample, the
rely on the

interests of

in

directors-but,

common-law rule

general,

banning tricky

or

ex

we

mislead

ing circulars.

Similarly

our

stockholder-proposal rule is but a pale
Though it provides for inclusion of

imitation of yours.

members' resolutions and circulation of
ture, it

only applies

bers

those

or

representing

supporting

litera

a

hundred

mem

one-twentieth

or more

of the

when invoked

by

by them.
superior-the supporting state
Only
ment may run to a thousand words instead of merely
to a hundred. This at least has the advantage of enabling
the statement to be expressed in reasonable English in
stead of the jingle-esc prevalent here. In practice little use
is made of this provision. As your experience has shown,
a resolution so
proposed has virtually no chance of pass
ing without independent proxy solicitation, and we have
voting rights,
in

one

and the expense has

to

be borne

respect is it

little of that.

particularly modern-the Germans have for some
time recognized the distinction between managers and
overseers to which
you now seem to be tending.
Our rules are also generally stricter than yours as re
gards length of notice of meetings and the extent to
which the business of the meeting must be detailed in
the notice. On most important matters at least twenty
one
days' previous notice must be givt:n, and it is in
variably the practice, and generally legally essential, to
set out the precise resolutions to be
proposed unless these
are
of
the
business
of the annual
merely part
ordinary
Resolutions
of
which
the
stockholders
general meeting.

As in America, battles for control have recently been
frequent, though none has been on the mammoth scale
regarded as appropriate here or not anything like a mil

have

stockholders

is

not

been warned

are therefore unknown, because
be
moved. Even amendments to
they
lawfully
resolutions included in the notice are only permissible
within very narrow limits.

not

cannot

However, all this

is

unimportant compared

with the

problem of minimizing the advantage enjoyed by the
existing management through their control of the proxy

lion dollars. Nor have
"outs"

can recover

if

succeed in

they

we

their

yet had to decide whether the
from the corporate treasury

costs

becoming

"ins." Nor have

professional

firms of proxy solicitors yet reared their well-groomed
heads. We have one practice, however, which you might
perhaps borrow--that of providing that proxy forms
must

be

lodged

with the company

prior

to

the

meeting.

This prevents the deliberate prolongation of the meeting
so that
high-powered solicitation may cause the absent

change their votes. This provision is not
invariably adopted in the constitution;
mandatory
to prevent abuse, the act insists that the time of lodg
to

but is

ment

the

shall

not

be

longer

than

forty-eight

hours before

meeting.

In this short discussion I have

those

matters

in which it seemed

deliberately

stressed

that

English

to me

experience might
in
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so

doing

I have

poration law is now incomparably richer and more high
ly developed than its English parent. Answers to many
questions which have never been litigated in England
can be found in the American reports. But, alas, how

be worth your attention. I trust that
not given the impression that I regard

corporate law as generally superior. Nothing
could be farther from the truth, and, had I been address
ing a British audience, the emphasis would have been

English

any Englishman tries to find them. I cannot call
mind any case in recent years in which American
authorities on a point of corporate law have been drawn

rarely

the virtues
very different. I should then have extolled
of your SEC legislation, from which we could certainly

to

already touched on some instances. There
example, the regulation of trust indentures

to

borrow. I have
are

and

others; for
trustees

for bondholders under the

trust

the attention of

far

seek:

to

statutes

act.

I should have

pointed

out

that

of your

most

English

practitioners

court.

The

is

reason

not

think of American

cor

alien system with different
and different principles. In fact, as I have tried

poration law

indenture

an

most

an

as

entirely

emphasize today, the statutes may be different, but
of the principles are the same. Even when we carry
out the periodical overhaul of our legislation, we do not,
to

states

have either abolished the anachronistic ultra vires doc
trine or so drawn its teeth that it can no longer inflict

most

much hurt. In contrast, we in England have mitigated
its rigor only to the extent of making it easier for a

I fear, pay as much attention as we should to American
practice. For example, the Cohen Committee declared

company to alter its authorized objects. In a recent Eng
lish case all but one of the debts of a company could not
be proved in its liquidation, because the company had

mula

omitted

take

to

advantage

of this

facility

when it

that it would be
ture

insuring
holders.

They

sidered Section

changed

mittedly

its activities.

impossible to produce a legislative for
independence of trustees for deben

the

do

310(b)

not

seem

even

to

have

con

of the Trust Indenture Act. Ad

the Committee

on

No-Par Shares

experience; but

carefully
hardly
to adopt

could

re

do

of your courts
emphasized
those
have rightly refused to saddle
dealing with a cor
of
the contents of its
poration with constructive notice

viewed American

by-laws. The unfortunate English rule in
this regard has partially destroyed the efficiency of the
admirable rule in Royal British Bank v. Turquand. This
rule, that outsiders are not to be damnified by defects
in indoor management, has rightly been envied by many

Unhappily the same is true of American reliance on
English authorities. Until the first World War it was
common
to find
English decisions cited in American

that

I should also have

most

otherwise,

observers, but

useful if it

were not

practice be far

it would in

for the limitations

corporation
even

the

our

refusal

cannot

I should have

pointed

out

that American

have

the Alumni

said

in

point

in New Mexico

that

today

should

an

will
or

diligently

search

Missouri. I would

English authority

cause

would be

at

of you to evince suf
company law to turn to it as

but

English

one

last resort, I shall feel that my time has not been
wasted. I can only hope that you will not think that I
a

have wasted yours.

School

•

Local

case

rich
who

as

ficient interest in

the

University of Chicago Law
Chicago 37 Illinois

thought

Illinois
one

as

at

think, unfortunate, for cross-fertilization might well
improve the strain of both breeds. If anything I have

cor-

of

an

a

least

Chicago lawyer

law is

I

Quarterly Publication
for

Now it is very rare. And you do not
excuse that English reports are inaccessible,

persuasive, but he won't try to find one. The
reason, I suppose, is that it isn't in Shepard.
Whatever the reasons for this mutual ignorance, it is,

least
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find

until he finds

ination.

Finally,

an

cases.

have the

incomparably rich, but English
as that of most
single states. Yet

with

being nearly fifty years
to allow no-par-value
shares which are certainly far more logical and easily
comprehended than those with an arbitrary nominal
value. We recently appointed a committee to consider
the legalization of no-par shares, and it reported favor
ably. Despite the opposition of the Trades Union Con
gress-for entirely unworthy reasons to my mind-the
government has recently announced that it will introduce
legislation "in due course." So we may catch you up be
fore too long and perhaps avoid your mistaken policy
of making no-par shares unpopular by tax discrim
behind the times in

us

asked

American reports often are in England. I have already
admitted that on a nation-wide basis your case law is

unrealistic constructive notice doctrine.
I should have chided

being

they

as

more

imposed by

they

were

American child.

charter and

American

since
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